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Why	won’t	the	UK	get	a	good	Brexit	deal	on	financial
services?	One	word:	Norway
When	it	comes	to	financial	services,	the	UK	will	not	be	able	to	negotiate	better	access	than
Norway	currently	enjoys,	writes	Morten	Kinander	(Norwegian	Business	School).	It	is	simply	not
in	the	EU’s	interest	to	create	a	parallel	equivalence	regime	for	Britain.	That	is	why	the	‘Norway’
(EEA)	model	should	not	be	ruled	out.	Claims	that	it	would	turn	the	UK	into	a	‘rule-taker	rather	than
a	rule-maker’	are	an	oversimplification.
As	seems	to	become	clearer	as	time	passes,	there	might	not	be	too	many	alternatives	for	the	UK’s
financial	sector	if	the	UK	wishes	to	gain	access	to	the	single	market	post-Brexit.	In	fact,	the	EU	recently	rejected
many	of	the	solutions	that	the	UK	still	clings	to	when	it	finally	granted	Norway	permanent	access	to	the	markets.
Judging	from	that	experience,	the	EEA	solution	presents	itself	as	the	least	unrealistic	of	the	UK’s	options.
There	has	been	considerable	debate	concerning	the	choice	of	model	for	the	UK’s	access	to	the	EU’s	financial
markets	after	Brexit.	Depending	on	whether	it	ends	up	being	a	hard	or	a	soft	Brexit,	the	choice	is	basically	between
two	models,	if	the	UK	wishes	continued	access	to	the	EU’s	financial	markets:	‘equivalence’	or	‘passporting’.	While
the	first	rides	on	the	back	of	the	hard	line,	the	second	requires	a	soft	Brexit	with	EEA	membership.	Hard	Brexit
necessitates	some	form	of	a	bespoke	arrangement,	while	a	soft	one	is	an	‘off-the-rack’	solution	with	fittings.
Equivalence	means	that	you	get	access	based	on	having	the	same	kind	of	rules,	while	passporting	means	that	you
get	a	licence	due	to	being	subjected	to	the	same	regulator	and	supervisor.	The	first	is	a	shaky	privilege;	the	second
is	a	long-standing	right.	This	we	all	know.	The	problem	lies	elsewhere,	namely,	achieving	predictable	access	without
secession	of	sovereignty.	And	this	is	where	the	EU	probably	will	not	give	in	–	simply	because	it	cannot	give	in.
Sculpture	by	Gustav	Vigeland	at	the	Vigelandsanlegget,	Frogner-Parken,	Oslo.	Photo:	Truus,
Bob	&	Jan	too!	via	a	CC-BY-NC	2.0	licence
There	are	really	no	existing	financial	industries	that	rely	on	equivalence.	Granted,	it	is	used,	by	US	clearing	houses
for	example,	but	only	in	a	piecemeal	fashion,	and	to	the	extent	that	specific	rules	allow	for	it.	To	turn	this	model	into	a
working,	permanent	arrangement	would	require	granting	special	status	to	the	UK	with	increased	rights	compared	to
those	granted	to	EU	Member	States.	Crucially,	it	also	requires	the	EU	to	change	its	mind,	after	recently	having
rejected	a	similar	proposal	from	Norway	(an	EEA	State),	which,	for	both	constitutional	and	political	reasons,	had
problems	in	accepting	that	an	organisation	that	they	are	not	a	member	of	can	have	supervisory	powers	in	its
jurisdiction.	Sounds	familiar?
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In	fact,	the	2016	negotiations	between	Norway	and	the	EU,	which	led	to	the	erection	of	a	model	that	might	also	work
for	the	UK,	throw	a	gloomy	light	on	the	prospects	of	an	equivalence	model	for	the	UK.	I	say	this	in	full	recognition	of
the	immense	difference	in	bargaining	power	between	Norway	and	the	UK.	But	a	large	part	of	the	reason	why	the
prospects	for	such	a	solution	for	the	UK	are	so	grim	has	little	to	do	with	bargaining	power:	access	to	the	EU’s
financial	markets	is	a	matter	of	law,	not	of	politics.	It	is	a	question	of	fitting	into	an	established	legal	structure	that	has
recently	been	the	subject	of	a	serious	overhaul	of	its	regulatory	architecture	after	the	financial	crisis.	It	is,	in	other
words,	a	matter	of	constitutional	rule	of	law	thinking,	as	opposed	to	political	desirability.	And	here	the	overhaul	is
important.	The	overhaul	partly	took	the	form	of	tighter	regulation.	But,	more	importantly,	it	consisted	of	a	new	model
for	the	EU’s	supervision	of	the	financial	markets:	a	supervision	of	the	supervisors,	bearing	the	acronyms	of	EBA,
ESMA,	EIOPA,	and	ESRB	(the	ESAs).	After	2010,	the	EU	has,	for	better	or	for	worse,	designed	a	system	that	is
exactly	meant	to	prevent	differentiation	according	to	market	size,	with	the	overall	message	being	‘ever	closer
integration’.	In	such	a	setting,	divergence	equals	disintegration.
Before	2010,	Norway	had	full	access	to	all	the	relevant	arenas	of	policy	and	regulation	in	the	EU	simply	by	virtue	of
its	EEA	membership.	From	2010	onwards,	following	the	introduction	of	the	new	supervisory	architecture,	with	four
important	EU	Regulations	endowing	the	new	supervisory	system	with	more	potent	supranational	powers,	the	tone
changed;	Norway	was	relegated	to	observer	status,	pending	the	solution	to	the	passport	issue,	after	requests	of
‘equivalence’	were	rejected.	Norway	either	had	to	change	its	constitution	to	allow	an	organisation	that	it	was	not	a
member	of	to	exercise	control	over	it,	or	to	come	up	with	a	different	solution.	Getting	the	passport	depended	now	not
only	on	being	an	EEA	member,	but	also	on	accepting	direct	supervision	by	the	ESAs	on	specifically	designated
areas	and/or	specifically	defined	emergency	times.
The	solution	that	was	adopted	builds	on	and	expands	the	existing	‘two-pillar	system’	to	accommodate	the	new
regulatory	and	supervisory	aspect	of	the	EU	institutions,	and	it	might	even	work	for	the	UK.	It	operates	on	the
assumption	that,	when	necessary,	the	EU’s	supervisory	authorities	will	make	a	rule	or	take	a	decision	that	will	then
be	copied	by	the	EFTA	authorities,	and	made	into	EEA	law,	replacing	only	the	name	of	the	institutions	in	the
provisions	with	the	relevant	EEA	institution.	To	illustrate,	if	ESMA,	the	EU	supervisory	authority	of	securities	markets,
decides	that	the	Norwegian	financial	regulator	is	failing	in	its	duties	to	oversee	the	Norwegian	market,	ESMA	can
issue	a	draft	decision	to	make	it	do	certain	things,	to	remedy	the	perceived	defects.	This	draft	will	be	sent	to	the
EFTA	Surveillance	Authority,	which,	although	being	under	no	legal	duty	to	do	so,	issues	a	corresponding,	binding
decision	over	the	Norwegian	financial	regulator.	And	voilà,	ESMA’s	view	becomes	Norwegian	law.	This	element	of
non-obligation	on	the	part	of	the	EFTA	is	important,	because	if	bound,	the	EFTA	States	would	not	have	been
constitutionally	able	to	accept	the	arrangement.	As	it	stands,	it	is	an	expression	of	a	political	will	to	honour	the
arrangement,	and	not	a	legal	obligation.
As	such,	Norway	not	only	gets	its	much-needed	passports	and	secure	access	to	the	financial	markets,	it	also
retrieves	what	it	lost,	namely	full	participation	in	all	relevant	meetings	where	policy	issues	and	regulation
development	are	hammered	out.	This	includes	not	only	participation	in	the	boards	of	the	ESAs,	but,	crucially,	in	the
hundreds	of	meetings	each	year	where	policy	is	hammered	out	and	regulations	drafted.	Solving	the	constitutional
issue	was	therefore	regarded	as	vitally	important	in	two	respects:	firstly,	for	the	purpose	of	achieving	passporting
rights;	and	secondly	for	the	attendance	in	these	meetings.	Without	such	attendance,	influence	in	the	drafting	process
would	be	lost,	together	with	an	understanding	of	why	new	financial	regulation	is	being	made,	and	how	it	is	thought	to
be	applied	in	the	individual	states.	It	will	not	take	long	for	the	UK	to	diverge	from	an	established	and	unified
supervisory	practice	without	access	to	the	background	of	new	financial	regulation	by	the	ESAs,	or	to	the	dialogue
among	the	national	regulators	as	to	how	to	apply	it.
In	these	settings,	Norway	is	taken	seriously	well	beyond	its	weight	class	when	it	comes	to	areas	where	it	has	special
knowledge,	for	example	within	the	area	of	commodity	derivatives.	According	to	government	officials	who	participate
in	these	meetings,	the	discussions	are	based	on	merit,	with	EU	technocrats	being	first	and	foremost	interested	in
drawing	the	most	expedient	form	of	regulation.	In	other	words,	if	you	are	a	heavyweight	in	such	circumstances,
power	comes	even	more	generously	–	even	without	voting	rights.	With	its	stellar	market	knowledge,	the	UK	could,
therefore,	expect	to	exert	considerable	influence	in	these	forums,	and	should	be	careful	about	ditching	the	EEA
alternative.	At	least,	it	will	retain	its	constitutional	independence,	and	will	not	be	bound	by	the	European	Court	of
Justice.	It	will	not	even	be	bound	by	the	EFTA	Court,	whose	decisions	are	advisory.	Commentators	and	political
pundits	alike	should	therefore	avoid	simplistic	‘rule-taker,	not	rule-maker’	talk.
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This	post	originally	appeared	at	the	Oxford	Business	Law	Blog.	It	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of
the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.
Morten	Kinander	is	Professor,	dr.juris	at	the	Norwegian	Business	School,	BI,	and	Director	of	the	Center	for	Financial
Regulation.
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